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Appendix to the Opinion of the Court
By K.C. CERNY*
The reaction of the Northern press to the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment was unusual There was no care/ul consideration of the
meaning of the specific phrases constituting the Amendment's five
sections. Instead, editorial comment focused on the broadpolitical
implications of the document within the context of an assumed un-
derstanding of the term "civil rights. "
An examination of editorials in leading newspapers during the pe-
riod of congressional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment fails to
reveal a consensus as to the meaning of that provision. Instead, there
were at least three broad views of the intent embodied in the proposal,
each of which was closely tied to partisan leaning. The proposed
amendment seems to have served as a symbol for many of the divisive
issues of the day.
During the winter and spring of 1866, the wartime Union coalition
of Republicans and Democrats was beginning to dissolve. President
Johnson's vetoes of the Freedman's Bureau bill on February 19, and of
the Civil Rights bill on March 27, marked the beginning of an open
split within the Union coalition over the meaning of Reconstruction. It
is therefore impossible to separate editorial commentary on the import
of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment from the broader question of
the proper approach to Reconstruction.
An analysis of press commentary is further confounded by the
amendment's obscure origin. On April 29 the Joint Committee on Re-
construction (the Committee of Fifteen) reported out to the House a
draft of the amendment in its present five section format. Following
congressional action it was sent to the states in mid-June (procedural
irregularities render the exact date indeterminate). However, each of
the sections of the proposal initially had been reported to the House
and Senate as independent amendments during January, February and
March. Commentary is scarce in May and June because the editorials
refer back to positions taken earlier. Commentary in February and
* Graduate Fellow, The University of Texas at Austin; B.A. 1973, Princeton Uni-
versity.
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March on the separate, independent amendments was overshadowed
by discussion of the veto override fights with respect to the Freedman's
Bureau bill and the Civil Rights bill of 1866. These veto override at-
tempts were momentous; the successful override of the Civil Rights bill
veto was reportedly only the second in the history of the nation.'
During this period the newspapers and journals were openly allied
with political factions. The New York Tribune and the Chicago Trib-
une were avowedly radical Republican in editorial outlook. The
World of New York called itself the mouthpiece of the Democratic
party and the New York Times attempted to defend the Union coali-
tion. The Nation considered itself to be the most thoughtful radical
Republican journal of the time. Interesting comment from afar was
supplied by the London Times, whose editors staunchly supported Pres-
ident Johnson and the Democrats, and by the Idaho Statesman, which
supported the Union coalition.
According to the radical Republican press, the "Reconstruction
Amendment"-the five-section May draft-should have been the legal
basis for reconstructing the southern states into fitting, permanent
members of the Union. It was to be a guarantee that another Civil War
would be impossible. These journals felt the draft could not accom-
plish these objectives; it was a "feeble thing."' At the same time, the
Democratic press criticized the proposed amendment as embodying
everything that was wrong with radical Republican politics: it was im-
precise, it threatened the federal system and it was hypocritical. The
Democrats charged that the proposed amendment was part of a radical
scheme to establish national political hegemony. The Union, or mod-
erate, press argued that whatever the precise meaning of the proposed
amendment, it was interpreted by the Northern populace as a radical
document and that it would serve as a rallying point for radical candi-
dates in the forthcoming congressional elections.
1. Chicago Tribune, Apr. 7, 1866, at 2, col. 1; London Times, Apr. 30, 1866, at 10, col.
I. Although the veto of the Freedman's Bureau bill ignited a controversy between the Presi-
dent and the radicals, it was not until the announcement by Senators Dixon, Hendricks,
Norton and Nesmith and Congressmen Randall, Doolittle, Browning and Cowan (all John-
sonites) that they would hold a separate convention apart from the National Union Party
Convention that the Union coalition officially split. N. Y. Tribune, June 27, 1866, at 4, col.
4. The division which burst into flame in February had been smoldering for a long time:
"The political crisis now existing in the United States is not a mere Constitutional struggle
between the PRESIDENT and the Legislature. It involves practical questions of vital im-
portance to the future well-being of the Union, and brings to a definite issue the conflicting
policies which throughout the war, and even before the war commenced, were contending
for mastery in the North." London Times, Mar. 10, 1866, at 9, col. 4.
2. Chicago Tribune, May 5, 1866, at 2, col. 1.
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In the view of the radical Republican press, the proposed amend-
ment in its composite form suffered from most of the defects that each
section had suffered in the earlier (January through April), independ-
ent form. Bolting the several proposals into a package might even com-
pound the problem. Labeling the proposed amendment a "small
affair," an editorial in the Chicago Tribune read in part:
The proposition as it stands embraces a reenactment of the Civil
Rights law [of 1866] in the form of a constitutional amendment,
and a reenactment of the existing test oath in the form of a law of
Congress. Both of these provisions are surplusage, and the latter
is calculated to irritate the Southern people without producing
any corresponding benefit. The provisions relating to the basis of
representation and the payment of the rebel war debts, are wise
and just, and no reasonable man can object to them.3
The New York Tribune was also unenthusiastic:
The Amendment now before the Senate is too complicated and
cumbrous. It needs a Philadelphia lawyer to expound and eluci-
date it. That section which proposes a general disenfranchise-
ment of ex-Rebels till 1870 is (we presume) to be stricken out, as
we trust it may be. It will never amount to anything in practice if
retained.4
The radical press felt trapped. On the one hand, it could not op-
pose a measure which repudiated the rebel war debt (Section 4) and
which limited a state's federal representation according to its denial of
the vote to its inhabitants (Section 2). Yet, on the other hand, it saw the
Test Oath (Section 3), especially in the harsher House version of the
amendment, as politically inopportune. Moreover, it saw nothing in
any of the sections which would force a shift in the basis of political
power in the South. Finally, the radical press was very sensitive to the
Democratic charge that Section 1 of the proposed amendment retroac-
tively ensured the constitutionality of the Civil Rights bill. The Repub-
licans had argued that Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
provided Congress with the necessary authority to protect civil rights:5
slavery, according to the radical press, constituted discrimination by
allowing some men rights denied to others.6 The next step in Recon-
3. Id
4. N. Y. Tribune, May 28, 1866, at 4, col. 3.
5. Id, Apr. 6, 1866, at 4, col. 4; Chicago Tribune, Apr. 12, 1866, at 2, col. 1; 2 NATION
422-23 (1866).
6. See Chicago Tribune, Feb. 21, 1866, at 2, col. 1; id, Feb. 28, at 2, col. 1; N. Y.
Tribune, Jan. 17, 1866, at 4, col. 3; Id, Mar. 1, at 4, col. 3; Id, Apr. 6, 1866, at 4, col. 4:
"And if Congress cannot secure to the negro the simple rights guaranteed to him by this
[Civil Rights] bill, it cannot in any way enforce the constitutional prohibition of Slavery. A
law against murder, which should be construed as excepting throat-cutting, would be as
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struction, according to the radicals, should be to provide southern
blacks with effective political power-something the Thirteenth
Amendment did not do. The continuing theme of the radical Republi-
can press was that the proposed amendment would not provide such
political power, thus failing to advance Rec struction.7
The Democratic press agreed that the proposed amendment would
not guarantee blacks political power. The one provision directly ad-
dressed to this matter was the second section, which would penalize
states that refused to grant blacks the suffrage on racial grounds. But
this section was so loosely drafted that it would be easy to evade. As
early as February 2, the World pointed out that the use of a literacy test
or the imposition of property qualifications would have the same effect
as blatant discrimination, and although effectively barring blacks from
voting, either would be constitutional.8 Since the proposal would not
further the openly stated radical goals, the Democratic press was con-
vinced that it had a hidden purpose.9 The World was convinced that
the Republican leadership had little love for blacks save for the votes
they represented.' 0 Furthermore, rank and file Republicans were not
sophisticated enough to understand their leadership. The World stated
this clearly in its analysis of the Civil Rights measure:
The Republicans stand for the Civil Rights bill from a rude
sense of natural justice. It seems to them that the government
having freed the negro, is bound to protect them; that its power to
compel their obedience and use them as soldiers, implies a recip-
rocal obligation to defend them from oppression. With the mass
effective as an interpretation of the great amendment which should authorize Congress to
prohibit slavery, but deny to it the power to secure civil rights to the enslaved."
7. The NATION's kindest editorial on the subject began: "The Committee of Fifteen,
after six months of constant labor and anxious thought, have presented their final report to
Congress. . .A great majority of that party [Republican] would, we are convinced, prefer
that Congress should go further than the committee have ventured to recommend, but they
will none the less cordially support the propositions of the committee, so far as they go." 2
NATION 744 (1866).
8. N. Y. World, Feb. 2, 1866, at 4. Since the Thirteenth Amendment had abolished
slavery and thus the three-fifths rule, Southern states would return to Congress with larger
delegations than before the war (the ex-slaves being counted as whole persons, not the three-
fifths of a person mandated by Article I, Section 2). Republicans felt that something should
be done to prevent a state from gaining seats in Congress and the Electoral College on the
basis of inhabitants who were systematically denied the franchise. The problem was that the
loose wording of the various proposed "Representation Amendments" left loopholes. "It is
because the [Representation] amendment settles so little and can be so easily evaded that it
is so particularly objectionable." London Times, Feb. 15, 1866, at 9, col. 5. Universal suf-
frage was at all times a separate issue.
9. "They [radical leaders] are not so much misguided as designing." London Times,
Jan 5, 1866, at 6, col. 6.
10. N. Y. World, Jan. 24, 1866, at 4.
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of Republicans, it is not a question of constitutional right, but of
common sense.
11
According to the Democrats, the Republican leadership in time of
peace was only compounding its wartime constitutional perversions.
During the war, the World charged that "conscription, arrests without
any legal process whatever, the entire overthrow of every guarantee of
constitutional liberty, the utter prostration of the judicial power, and
the execution of citizens by military commissions" were among Repub-
lican crimes. 2 Following the war, the extension of the war powers in-
terpretation of the Constitution into peacetime to justify the occupation
of the South and the refusal to admit Southern delegates to Congress
were ongoing corruptions. 3 The World charged that the real purpose
of the proposed amendment was to keep the South out of the Union,
thus keeping Southern electoral votes out of the Electoral College-to
prolong disunion. The Republican leadership would do so by cleverly
shifting the public blame for disunion to the Southern whites. 14 They
could reenter the Union by ratifying the proposed amendment, but in
the process they would be voting their own disenfranchisement under
Section 3. The World predicted that the result of the Amendment
would not be an increase in civil rights:
If no more legitimate channel [of political activity] is opened
to the Southern politicians, they may weave the whole South into
a vast system of affiliated secret societies, into which they could
draw a larger proportion of the Southern population than the
Fenians have of our Irish population into theirs."
The only positive result of the proposed amendment, according to the
World, was that it was an admission that Reconstruction was beyond
the contemporary powers of Congress. Judging the northern popula-
tion to contain about equal proportions of radical Republicans and
Democrats, the decision on Reconstruction would be made by the con-
servative Republicans," an assessment with which the New York Trib-
une agreed.17
The moderates during the winter and spring of 1866 were those
who still supported the Union coalition, conservative Republicans and
a variety of Democrats. In their view, the chief objective of national
policy should have been the restoration of political stability. The pro-
11. I., Apr. 6, 1866, at 4.
12. Id, Mar. 6, 1866, at 4.
13. Id
14. Id, Apr.'30, 1866, at 4.
15. Id, May 5, 1866, at 4.
16. Id, May 21, 1866, at 4; Id, May 30, 1866, at 4.
17. N. Y. Tribune, May 29, 1866, at 4, col. 3.
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posed amendment in its composite form was to be supported because it
was unobjectionable. The New York Times stated this viewpoint in
phraseology which recalled the previous discussion of the independent
amendments:
Four of these amendments met no opposition in the Union ranks.
Every member of the Union Party had declared himself in favor
of the section guaranteeing an equality of civil rights, of that bas-
ing representation on voters, of the one repudiating the rebel debt
and of the last giving Congress power to make these amendments
effective by legislation. 18
The one objectionable item, Section 3-the disenfranchising of ex-
rebels until 1870-was opposed by the New York Times because it
would prolong unrest and hinder economic recovery in the South. Ac-
cording to the New York Times, the composite amendment was no acci-
dent; it was the carefully contrived product of Thaddeus Stevens. He
was allegedly interested only in the disenfranchisement section and
therefore sandwiched Section 3 inside the four unobjectionable sections
and ramrodded the package through the House without debate by call-
ing for the previous question (the "gag" law). On this crucial procedu-
ral vote, Stevens' support came from radical Republicans and
Democrats, the latter apparently trying to make the proposed amend-
ment as obnoxious to the states as possible.' 9 After the Senate modified
the harsh language of Section 3, the New York Times supported the
proposal:
The amendments [the five sections of the Fourteenth] to the Con-
stitution, as they now stand, will not encounter strenuous objec-
tion from any quarter. All are willing to submit to the States the
question whether they will concede to Congress the power to pre-
vent unequal State legislation touching the civil rights of citizens
of the United States.'
This assertion by the New York Times on May 31 could have been
an accurate assessment of the political status of the proposed amend-
ment only if by "civil rights" the New York Times was referring to
something other than the month and a half old Civil Rights Act. The
18. N. Y. Times, May 14, 1866, at 4, col. 2. Editorials in the New York Times tended to
be vitriolic-especially so when the subject was Congressman Thaddeus Stevens. It is mis-
leading to focus on the late April-first week of May editorials before Section 3 was softened
in the Senate for the New York Times' analysis of civil rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Once the amendment ceased to be solely the product of Mr. Ste% ens, the New York
Times changed its position.
19. Id, May 12, 1866, at 4, col. 3; Id, May 14, 1866, at 4, col. 2-3. see also London
Times, May 28, 1866, at 7, col. 4; the New York World defense for the Democratic voting
behavior which appeared on May 12, 1866, at 4.
20. N. Y. Times, May 31, 1866, at 4, col. 4.
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radical Republicans would hardly be willing to submit their hard won
veto-override victory to a popular referendum. The Democratic press
saw the amendment as a broad challenge to the federal system: It
would permit interminable congressional meddling in internal state af-
fairs. In short, the New York Times saw the Civil Rights Act and the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment as two quite different things. Yet, if
"civil rights" meant something more than the recently enacted Civil
Rights Act, it is difficult, if not impossible, to define precisely what this
crucial term was thought to mean. There simply was no discussion of it
in the context of any section of the proposed amendment. The term did
acquire a general meaning within the context of the political argu-
ments, but as with the amendment itself, the political context provides
three different definitions of "civil rights." The one common point in
these different views was that each dealt with the possibility of a dis-
tinction between political and civil rights.
The radical Republican press rejected any attempt to separate civil
from political rights: "The distinction between civil and political rights
is an illusory one; at any rate, the ballot is necessary to the secure en-
joyment of all other rights. ... 1 The primacy of political power
formed the core of the radical Republican analysis of Reconstruction.
Editorial after editorial repeated the view that Southern blacks would
be free only when they had effective suffrage. 2 Variations in this
theme indicate the broad radical conception of civil rights. The New
York Tribune called these rights "equal human rights;' 23 any interfer-
ence with them would be a reinstitution of slavery.
In February and March, before the composite Fourteenth Amend-
ment had been drafted, the Nation attacked the proposed civil rights
and representation amendments as fatally flawed unless they were to be
coupled with universal suffrage. 4 The Nation was quite specific in ar-
guing that universal suffrage meant more than a simple guarantee that
all males could vote. Effective suffrage, according to its editorials, in-
21. N. Y. Tribune, Mar. 8, 1866, at 4, col. 4.
22. For editorials covering most of the radical arguments, see generally 2 NATION 70-7 1,
134, 422-23 (1866).
23. This phrase appears in an editorial explaining that the Constitution was an incom-
plete document. "Mr. Jefferson is, and ought to be, held in sincere reverence by all Radicals
because of his agency in basing the Declaration of Independence on the broad, comprehen-
sive, eternal principles of Equal Human Rights." N.Y. Tribune, Apr. 9, 1866, at 4, col. 3. A
later editorial implies that the full extent of these rights will only be recognized gradually:
"Let us rejoice friends of Equal Rights that our country has taken a long stride forward on
the road to that goal where, Law being identical with Right, every one upholds and blesses
Law as the guardian of his interest and his freedom." Id, Apr. 10, 1866, at 4, col. 4.
24. 2 NATION at 161.
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cluded free speech so that voters could make intelligent choices. The
"guarantee" of permanent peace would come when Southern society
had accepted this political order:
If we want peace at the South, and permanent peace, we
must in some way or other first of all familiarize the mass of the
people with the idea of law as an irresistable power to which all
must bow, and which throws the same amount of protection over
the meanest as well as the proudest black or white. If this can
only be done by force, force we must have to do it, and, until this
is done, the first step has still to be made in the re-organization of
Southern society.25
The rule of law would be considered present, according to .the Nation,
when Henry Ward Beecher could read a New York Tribune article to a
public gathering in a Southern city and later sell the paper.26
The Chicago Tribune argued that black self protection via the bal-
lot box required that the North first ensure political divisions within the
Southern white community. The real slaves in the South, according to
the Chicago Tribune, were the poor whites, "pitiable mental cripples,"
who blindly followed the leadership of the planter aristocracy.' Elec-
tions in the South had not served as an assurance of representation;
rather they were a ratification of the existing imbalance of political
power.21 Poor whites had to be educated to recognize their own politi-
cal and economic interests. The Chicago Tribune estimated southern
white illiteracy to be at least 50%.29 If the white community were frac-
tured, blacks would be able to protect themselves with the ballot.
"Civil rights" was therefore an expansive concept for the radical
Republicans. It included equality before the law, political power and
the means to make the political power effective: free speech and educa-
tion. Their lack of enthusiasm for'the proposed amendment and at-
tacks upon it for inadequacy suggest that the radical press thought the
amendment would not mandate their conception of civil rights. Only
25. Id, Jan. 18, 1866, at 70-71.
26. Id at 70.
27. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 24, 1866, at 2, col. 2.
28. Id
29. Id, Apr. 19, 1866, at 2, col. 1. The New York Tribune extended this argument in a
different direction: "[Tlhere were, in 1850, no less than 568,182 free adults in the Slave
States who could neither read nor write, of whom 226,898 were men and 341,284 were wo-
men; which accounts, in our opinion, first, for the folly of the Southern men in going into the
Rebellion, and, secondly, for the greater devotion of the Southern women to it-the zeal of
both being atributable [sic] and proportionate to their ignorance;...
That, as from the past history of the ruling classes, we have no right to expect that they
will educate the poor, it is our duty to do so (and our safety lies in doing so) ourselves.
Feb. 13, 1866, at 4, col. 5.
[Vol. 6.455
APPENDIX TO COURT'S OPINION
the radical papers continually referred to the first section of the pro-
posed amendment as a reenactment of the Civil Rights bill. They were
belittling it in hopes of forcing Congress to draft something more
profound.
The moderate, or Union, press implied through its arguments that
there was a distinction between civil and political rights, but that this
division was temporary. With an improving economy, the operation of
a free market would gradually draw the former slaves into full citizen-
ship. Criticism by the radical press that political power had to precede
economic power for the market to work was not given much credence.
The most important objective of Reconstruction, in the moderate view,
should be to guarantee the political stability needed to encourage eco-
nomic investment:
Individual effort may not suffice fully to cope with devasta-
tion so universal as that which the South brought upon itself, but
to the extent of its ability it would be forthcoming if the political
complications were so far disposed of as to leave room for the
venture. By means of this nature, more than by any conceivable
legislation, the just supremacy of the North would be established.
Prejudice would gradually disappear before the beneficent sway
of Northern capital, administered by Northern heads and hands,
and the political unity of the sections would be insured by inter-
ests as strong and diversified as those which render East and
West indissoluble.3"
The moderate press distrusted the radical emphasis on legislation.
"The 'guarantees' for the future," are, according to the Idaho States-
man, "idle buncombe. There can be no guarantees but law, and law
may be changed or abolished at any time by the power that made it."3 I
Nonetheless, the Union papers supported the Civil Rights bill32 and the
proposed amendment. Indeed, the Statesman characterized those
members of Congress who supported the Civil Rights bill veto-override
as being opposed to "throwing away the results of the war."33 The con-
cept of "civil rights" for the Union press was not well developed, and it
was certainly less inclusive than the radical conception. The following
description of the Civil Rights bill is indicative:
One of the strong points the copperhead press and stump
speakers will attempt to make in the campaign will be to repre-
sent that the bill established negro suffrage. They will insist that
30. N. Y. Times, May 22, 1866, at 4, col. 5.
31. Idaho Statesman, Jan. 27, 1866, at 2, col. 1.
32. The New York Times withheld support until mid-May, but thereafter began to sup-
port the bill. E.g., N. Y. Times, May 26, 1866, at 4, col. 3.
33. Idaho Statesman, Apr. 21, 1866, at 2, col. 2.
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it gives the ballot to negroes, Chinamen and all other classes hith-
erto excluded from the privilege. . . .They will continue to per-
versely misrepresent the provisions of the bill and howl "negro
suffrage" and "negro equality" whenever it is spoken of ....
The bill makes all persons born in the United States (excluding
Indians not taxed) citizens of the Republic, but only places them
under the protection of the laws, and gives them the power to
maintain their personal rights. . . .Their [Democratic and cop-
perhead] action places them where they belong: in opposition to
the administration of justice between men.34
A generalization justified by a reading of the editorials in the New York
Times and the Idaho Statesman during this period is that civil rights
were those protections required by a person entering the job market.
Economic success would, in time, be rewarded with participation in
politics-a privilege. Economic failure would preclude active political
participation. "Civil rights" were therefore more inclusive than the
property protections of the Civil Rights bill, and the public was being
asked to grant Congress these wider powers of protection. The New
York Times was considerably more sanguine about black potential for
self-advancement than the Statesman.
The Democratic press argued that a distinction should be made
between political and civil rights, and that civil rights only had mean-
ing within the definition of specific laws: where laws differed, rights
differed. According to the World, the whole purpose of a federal sys-
tem of government was to allow local communities to legislate for their
own particular needs, be they universal suffrage or polygamy. Radical
Republicans would jeopardize the ability of communities to differ in
solving local problems by giving the federal government the power to
define civil rights.35 Radicals were mistaken, according to the World, if
they thought that federal law and the federal judiciary would be able to
protect blacks from discrimination and prejudice. Blacks were pres-
ently protected in two ways: through the justice and benevolence of
their fellow men, and through the self-interest of communities needing
their labor.36 Radical Republicans relying on faulty information sup-
plied by "cotton thieves, speculators, and other irresponsible or un-
trustworthy persons" 37 had subjugated the former slaves to the
Freedman's Bureau which, rather than protecting them, was forcing
these hapless blacks to labor on land recently acquired by venial
northerners. The ballot would not protect blacks as long as they were
34. Id, June 26, 1866, at 2, col. 2.
35. N. Y. World, Mar. 28, 1866, at 4; id, Apr. 6, 1866, at 4; id, Mar. 15, 1866, at 4.
36. Id, Feb. 9, 1866, at 4.
37. Id, Jan. 4, 1866, at 4.
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dependents, and radicals had merely substituted dependence on the
federal government for dependence on masters.38 In the long run, the
World argued, black interests were tied to those of southern whites.
The best course of action, according to the Democrats, would be for the
federal government to restore the ex-rebels to their civil and political
rights through the restoration of civil government in the Southern
States.
The fact that the discussion of the proposed amendment proceded
at such a general level cannot simply be an accident. There was no
perceived need to consider the language of the proposed amendment
carefully and in detail. It was as if everyone knew what the language
meant. What needed to be discussed were the broad political issues and
the justifications for partisan preferences. The conclusion can be
drawn that the proposed amendment functioned essentially as a politi-
cal symbol. If it is so perceived, some logic could be attached to the
three very different interpretations of its purpose.
The one point on which all editorialists agreed was that the South
had to be returned to civilian rule. Beyond that there was little agree-
ment because there were such profound differences in philosophy, es-
pecially in the variant conceptions of the crucial term "civil rights."
For the radical press, the proposed amendment symbolized national
indecision-it made no firm commitment to restructure the South. The
moderate press, still hoping to preserve the Union coalition, could sup-
port the amendment after the Senate modified the Test Oath because it
would serve as a vague symbol around which people could be rallied in
an effort to restore political and economic stability. The Democratic
press, seething at the way the radicals in Congress had challenged and
unseated Democrats, saw the vagueness of the proposed amendment as
symbolic of the shadowy way radical leaders were trying to tighten
their grip on the national offices.
A final source of support for this interpretation of editorial opinion
came in July 1868. If one assumes that the proposed amendment was a
symbol of the political issues of 1866, then it is not surprising that in
1868 ratification was considered relatively unimportant: the issues had
signfcantly changed and old symbols were no longer newsworthy.39 This
attitude was reflected across the entire political spectrum: the Nation
38. Id, Jan. 29, 1866, at 4, and Feb. 14, 1866, at 4.
39. The political issues of 1868 included: the nearly successful impeachment of Presi-
dent Andrew Johnson, the forthcoming presidential election of 1868, Reconstruction, the
potential ramifications of the habeus corpus cases then before the Supreme Court, assassina-
tions and murders in the South and industrial development.
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reported ratification as a secondary news item of the week;40 the New
York Times buried the announcement on page five;41 the New York
Tribune devoted one line to the announcement;42 the London Times in
a one line announcement tersely reported ratification;43 and the World
argued that procedural requirements not having been satisfied, the
Fourteenth Amendment was in fact not yet ratified.44
40. 7 NATION at 61.
41. N. Y. Times, July 16, 1868, at 5, col. 3.
42. N. Y. Tribune, July 20, 1868, at I, col. 6.
43. London Times, Aug. 3, 1868, at 12, col. 1.
44. N. Y. World, July 21, 1868, at 1 (announcement of Secretary Seward's proclama-
tion); July 23, 1868, at 4 (editorial detailing the procedural irregularities). The problem
stemmed from the fact that since Ohio and New Jersey had rescinded their ratification of the
amendment following a change in party control of the state legislatures, Secretary Seward
waited until a sufficient number of the Reconstruction governments in the Southern States
ratified the amendment to yield the requisite proportion of all states. The Democrats did
not consider the Reconstruction governments to be valid state governments. Neither did
President Johnson, but he recognized the "states" as having ratified the amendment. Secre-
tary Seward's wording of the letter to President Johnson indicates some of the unease:
"[N]otices and certificates have also been received by the Secretary of State, that the same
proposed amendment has been ratified by the Legislatures of the States respectively of Ar-
kansas, Florida and North Carolina, which notices and certificates last mentioned were re-
ceived from the newly-constructed and established authorities, assuming to be and acting as
the Legislatures and Governors of the said States of Arkansas, Florida and North Carolina."
N. Y. Times, July 16, 1868, at 5, col. 4.
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